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IMF STABILISATION AND SSA STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: 
ARE THEY TECHNICALLY COMPATIBLE?
By Reginald Herbold Green
The International Monetary Fund is often charged with 
imposing austerity. This is a misconception... the 
austerity born of adjustment must be compared with 
the alternatives.
J. de Laroisiere, Managing 
Director, IMF, 1984
The crisis in Africa in recent years is 
overwhelmingly the product of external shocks... 
Without the heavy post-1978 blows or, given those 
blows, with adequate international buffers against 
them, the majority of African economies would not be 
sliding backward as they are now doing...
G. K. Helleiner, 1985
We must look our mistakes in the face if we are to 
avoid repeating them.
Rui Baltasar, Finance 
Minister, Mozambique
Insufficient financing leads to unwarranted 
exchange rate depreciation, restriction or debt 
default.
Onno Ruding, Bank-Fund 
Interim Committee Chairman
Prologue
The likelihood of a uniform and unconditional answer to the title of this 
paper applying to all SSA economies is negligible. Botswana over 1982-83 
operated an IMF type stabilisation strategy (albeit without using any IMF 
resources or actually concluding a standby). It was highly successful in 
reducing demand and imports and shifting financing patterns in a way which 
bolstered reserves. Because exports recovered rapidly and the cuts came after
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sustained output, real wage and import increases, the duration and cost of 
austerity were low. (See C. Harvey, this Bulletin.) Over 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 9 Rhodesia 
(as it then was) ran an IMF type stabilisation programme (for different 
reasons also without using Fund resources). That programme did restore 
current account balance, hold inflation below world levels and kept the 
recurrent budget more or less in balance. But because the external 
environment did not improve, GDP per capita, real consumption and real savings 
and investment fell year by year while the structure of production - which had 
changed rapidly over 1965-1974 - ceased to adjust (Kadhani and Green, 1985)- 
Zambia’s successive IMF programmes have at least endured and in that sense are 
more successful than a majority. But the current account has not been restored 
to balance, trade arrears reduced significantly or any base laid to restore 
real output without immediate re-emergence of gross external imbalance despite 
draconic real wage, government per capita spending and import cuts. As a 
result of success in the sense of continuity and failure to regain external 
balance, IMF debt service is now of the order of 25% of export earnings and 
one of the main problems to be surmounted to achieve external balance.
The type of diversity of result illustrated here is not very surprising. The 
Botswana case - except that the imbalances were supply reduction not demand 
increased caused - is very near the classic model in which a short term 
macro-monetary stabilisation programme should work if undertaken promptly. 
The economy was strong; a record of high rates of real increase for over a 
decade in both wages and public services made cuts uncomfortable rather than 
crippling; with a high ratio of imports to GDP and negligible import control 
cuts in imports were likely to follow fairly automatically from nominal demand 
restraint and to have low impact on real domestic production; the external 
shock (diamond export quotas forcing export cuts) could be expected to be - 
and was - self reversing.
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The Rhodesian case is intermediate. The economy was fairly strong and the 
response to the 1973-74 changes in global economic conditions fairly prompt. 
But, given a low ratio of imports to GDP and imports dominated by inputs into 
production and investment with few final consumer goods, import cuts imposed 
much larger cuts in domestic production. As the external economic environment 
did not recover \  the only way to maintain external and internal balance was 
to reduce output and capacity utilisation not once for all but on a sinking 
equilibrium path.
Zambia - like Rhodesia in 1974 - was hit by the collapse of a metal boom. Its 
economy was already weakened by the costs of Rhodesian rebellion, the rise in 
oil and grain prices and the production structure distortions arising from its 
previous export boom (See P. Daniel, this Bulletin). The cerms of trade 
shift's negative impact on effective GDP and real government revenue was so 
large that even a relatively high initial import to GDP ratio did not give 
room for cuts adequate to restoring either external or fiscal balance and that 
the cuts made caused significant domestic output reduction. As real metal 
prices never recovered, and the import cuts eroded the export base, the 
structural position if anything worsened.
IMF Resource Access And Adjustment: Necessary? Sufficient? Neither?
What is more surprising is the questions the three cases raise in respect to 
using IMF resources. Botswana did not need to - albeit it could have done so 
and given the brief duration of its imbalance 9%, 6 year money (the basic IMF 
terms) would not have created severe debt management problems.
Rhodesia - as a non-recognised entity - could not borrow from the IMF; had it 
been able to do so it probably would have. Given the 1 9 7 4 - 7 9 record in
« 9
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retrospect it is hard to see that - say - $250 million would have done 
anything more than worsen the medium term external balance situation. Zambia 
has - as the IMF debt service/export, ratio demonstrates - found that short 
term, semi commercial interest rate credit is not the road to structural 
adjustment any more than are commercial arrears.
The IMF has always been quite clear in stating that it was not in the 
development business. The question is whether in cases lasting longer or 
requiring more resources than the first credit tranche and Compensatory 
Finance Facility (to offset export declines) the IMF is an appropriate source 
of interim finance at all for low and middle income SSA economies. Unless 
they can expect a natural recovery of import capacity from exports there is 
reason to suspect that the answer is no.
The argument may well not apply to countries with idle capacity and/or 
domestic market oriented production shiftable to exports if domestic demand 
falls - e.g. Italy, Turkey, Brazil. There devaluation and demand cuts should 
lead to fairly rapid export increases and an approach to trade (including 
invisibles) balance, even if at a substantial cost. For countries whose 
exports are dominated by specific low price, low income elasticity primary 
products it is at least unclear that devaluation and domestic demand cuts do 
much to restore balance (c.f. Helleiner, 1984; Loxley, 1984) except at a very 
high domestic output lost cost and perhaps along a falling equilibrium. 
Certainly the input supply and capital requirements to maintain existing 
export bases have at times fallen victim to IMF programmes and the investment 
needed to build up new ones is even more vulnerable - as well as unlikely to 
produce substantial results inside the three year life of an IMF drawing 
2programme.
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Technical Mot Ideological
This line of critique is not ideological but technical. In fact the 
ideological element in IMF-SSA relations is rather overstressed. The bulk of 
the argument turns on political survivability (as recently in the Sudan), the 
proper time frame for adjustment, whether real supply or monetary demand 
should be the starting point in structural adjustment, the virtues of shock 
loading costs at the start versus phasing them parallel to benefits and 
similar issues which are not particularly usefully seen as having any very 
clear relationship to ideology as usefully defined.
There are issues which can be defined as ultimately ideological, e.g. free 
versus managed markets, privatisation, income transfers and distribution. 
However, in practice most actual debates turn on degrees and balances not 
either or choices and are very often mixed ideological, technical, factual. 
The IMF’s two most consistent strands of policy prescription: that devaluation
3is a good all purpose medicine^ best taken in large doses and that consumer
4subsidies are always highly undesirable simply do not add up to any standard 
political, political economic or economic ideology. Certainly the IMF is 
prone to be sure it knows best, to generalise from a limited number of cases,
*
to be selective in use of data (especially when available data is fragmentary, 
conflicting and of doubtful accuracy) and rigid in presenting its case not 
least in its occasional dialogues with friendly critics (See Killick - Editor,
1984). That is in a real sense an ideology, but not what is normally meant by 
ideological controversy about IMF prescriptions nor is it the main topic of 
the present paper.
The IMF Model Of Economic Imbalance And Its Cure
The IMF operates on a relatively uniform set of assumptions about the causes 
of external imbalance and the structures and response patterns of economies.
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Some of these are fairly explicit, others are implicit in lending policies
(See Williamson, 1982), others emerge only from looking at a set of programmes
5or detailed discussion in programme negotiations with IMF staff.
The basic asumptions can be put in eight clusters:
1 . the primary cause of external and internal imbalance is a major and 
usually sudden increase in use of real resources;
2 . demand reduction can restore balance by cutting back on recent personal 
(especially wage earner) and public (especially consumption transfer 
payment) consumption while allowing real investment to rise to take care 
of bolstering supply. Consequential output falls will be low, brief and 
not in areas key to the economy;
3 . room exists for rapid export expansion by reactivating capacity idled by 
overvalued exchange rates and/or shifting capacity freed by reduced 
demand from the domestic to the export market;
4. higher import prices (from devaluation) combined with reduced market
intervention/rationing of imports lead to lower import levels and to 
improved allocation of imports and production;
5 . the economy is relatively flexible and internally integrated without 
major real gaps or sectoral fragmentation (in one sense the basis for the 
two previous assumptions);
6 . nominal price changes can be expected to lead to real relative price
changes (externally and internally) and therefore improve allocative 
efficiency while reducing demand. Apparently the assumption includes the 
view that falling nominal demand can be achieved and will choke off 
inflation;
7 . demand and market intervention reduction and new relative price ratios
(including the exchange rate) should be done over a brief period to 
secure maximum shock effect toward rebalancing with fairly modest
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subsequent steps to undo reversals caused by inflation;
8 . restoration of balance and return to growth can be achieved in a 
relatively brief period - three years judging from the lending programme 
limit - because of the assumed flexibility and ability to raise exports 
sharply. Therefore given the assumption that imbalance follows sharp 
increases in real resource use, temporary cutbacks from '’shock” 
adjustment phasing will not pose major problems since they will soon be 
followed by renewed gains.
SSA's Post 1979 Economic Malaise And The Model
Whether these assumptions are or are not reasonably accurate either in general 
or in specific cases is not an ideological question but a mixed 
empirical/judgement one. There is a substantial body of judgement and of case 
studies (e.g. in Williamson, 1983; Killick, 1984; Deli, Lawrence, Helleiner,
1 9 8 5) to raise questions generally and especially in respect to most 
developing economies. However, the concern of the present paper is narrower. 
In SSA the following would appear to be the case with respect to the IMF’s 
assumptions:
1 . in a majority of cases the primary (and certainly the immediate) cause of 
imbalance was a fall in real resource availability triggered by an 
external shock (e.g. terms of trade, quantitative export demand decline, 
drought) or a war (civil or externally procured). High rates of real 
consumption increase before the sudden emergence of major imbalance are 
the exception (e.g. Botswana, in the very short run but not over a 5 year 
perspective, Zimbabwe) not the rule;
2 . demand reductions, therefore, will not merely reverse recent increases 
but cut into basic levels of resource use. Because profits, foreign 
finance and animal spirits are typically be low and falling, private 
investment is likely to be cut sharply. Cuts in government resource use
#  *
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adequate to restore recurrent budget balance will need to go much further 
than subsidies because real revenue falls very rapidly with demand 
constraint and interest payments rise rapidly from both the stabilisation 
finance and the initial deficit. Consequential domestic output falls are 
likely to be several times import cuts and - whether market or 
interventionist methods of constraint are used - import cuts are unlikely 
to be concentrated on final consumption goods as opposed to operating,
g
maintenance or investment inputs;
3. little room exists for rapid export expansion. Physical constraints 
(often exacerbated by stabilisation programme import cuts) both in 
agriculture and in related processing and transport are one factor and 
global (as well as domestic) price incentives another. Scope for 
switching doemstic production to export markets is usually limited 
(Zimbabwe manufacturing is a partial exception) even if forex tD maintain 
the output is available. Many traditional exports are doubtful 
candidates for rapid output increases for price elasticity reasons (See 
M. Godfrey, this Bulletin) and new ones are either hard to identify or 
will require substantial amounts of time, finance and forex to develop;
4. in cases (probably a majority) with a history of detailed import
licensing, major liberalisation is inconsistent with reducing import
levels because the true price elasticity is very low - especially for
amenity consumer goods. Even more generally, market incentives (i.e
quick, easy, relatively high profits) seem to result in liberalisation -
7at least on a broad front' - shifting the balance of imports away from 
maintenance and production inputs toward consumer amenities. This is not 
self evidently an allocational improvement as it is likely to maximise 
the present and future cost of any import reduction and, indeed, to erode 
the future export base;
0 •
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5. most SSA economies are fragile, with limited domestic integration and 
with very substantial production (as well as maintenance and investment) 
input gaps which can be supplied, only by imports. In many cases import 
to GDP ratios have fallen not because of - nor leading primarily to - 
import substitution but because of sheer absence of forex - leading 
primarily to massive capacity underutilisation and undermaintenance;
6. nominal price changes - partly because of cost plus pricing and partly 
because of physical constraints - tend to be overtaken rapidly by 
inflation; especially when initial changes are large. The only 
exceptions appear to be reductions in real wages and salaries and
O
effective grower prices for export or industrial crops. In general 
sharp increases in nominal grower prices, in government or parastatal 
charges and in basic import prices (e.g. fuel, food) act as engines of 
inflation not of redistribution or output level/pattern alteration;
7 . rapid macro monetary level changes tend both to have unexpected and
undesired side effects (e.g. credit ceilings blocking use of available
export production capacity, government budget cuts immobilising extension
personnel) and to generate cumulative inflationary forces which largely
or wholly offset them in a brief period of time. Further, by front end
*
loading costs they create problems of acceptance, morale and programme
survivability which are facts affecting likely stabilisation and
production outcomes even if they are social and political rather than
9narrowly economic facts.
8. given the initial (and unreversed) loss of command over real resources' 
dominant role in most SSA cases of extreme imbalance, the rigidity of
their economies and the poor prospects for high, sustained export growth, 
few can achieve a stable base for renewed growth within three years
without sharp increases in net forex availability sustained over three to 
seven years with limited and phased increases in debt servicing burden.
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Certain details of, or emphases within, this sketch are doubtless 
controversial. But it is by and larg^ the pattern which emerges from a range 
of studies (IDS, 1983; World Bank, 1984; JDP, 1985). Even the World 3ank's 
Accelerated Development Report (World Bank, 1981) did not project any 
significant 1979-1989 rise in real GDP per capita for low income African 
countries and its 1984 Programme (World Bank, 1984) in fact projects typical 
1990 real output per capita levels well below 1980 and, implicity at least, 
below 1970 in a substantial number of cases.
It would be inaccurate to say that the IMF is totally impervious to SSA 
realities. It does in specific cases recognise the problem of fitting its 
time frame to that needed for results in some SSA economies; it does see 
barriers to rapid import liberalisation and to cutting imports below current 
levels (indeed several actual or under negotiation programmes do have raising 
import levels as a key objective); it does not uniformly advocate trade 
surpluses as a viable short term target (but see Bhatia and Tahari, 1984). 
But these appear to be ad hoc adjustments in specific cases and not based on 
any general reappraisal or critique of the underlying assumptions of the 
Fund’s approach to stabilisation.
Some Non-Questions And Questions
Querying the IMF model does not imply asserting that one can avoid adjustment; 
that domestic policy played no role in causing or exacerbating imbalances; 
that prices do not matter nor that additional access to forex without coherent 
domestic strategy frames can be a sufficient condition for stabilisation, 
rehabilitation and recovery. Resource use must by one means or another be 
adjusted to resource availabilty; domestic policy has caused some situations 
of imbalance and worsened most; delayed response to the 1979 crisis (based in
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man y cases on the not then unreasonable view the world economy's 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 3  
scenario would resemble 1 9 7 4- 1 9 7 8) has greatly heightened problems both of 
stabilisation and structural adjustment; getting the prices wrong is a credo 
with few adherents and, if anything, most SSA governments now place more 
weight on getting nominal prices right than that approach as a single 
instrument can bear; coherent and sustained strategies related to actual 
structures and possibilities are necessary for additional access to resources 
to have sustained positive results (as the Sudan, Zaire and Zambia cases 
demonstate graphically) . 10
However, a series of questions do flow from comparison of the model's 
assumptions and SSA scenarios and structures:
If stabilisation is required basically because of supply side falls, should 
not structural adjustment centre on restoring command over resources 
particularly by higher capacity utilisation, enhanced
maintenance/rehabilitation, expansion of import earning capacity (i.e. 
exports) and critical import saving (i.e. import substitution) capacity rather 
than on further demand cuts? The view that some austerity programmes centred 
on demand cuts provide inadequate stimulation for export employment and growth1* 
(i.e. structural adjustment) is shared by Dutch Finance Minister and Interim 
Committee Chairman Onno Ruding (AED).
Given the rigidities in the economic structures and the poor prospects for 
present dominant exports of and in many countries should export promotion and 
import substitution be seen as alternatives or opposite sides of the same coin 
of restoring external balance consistent with resumed expansion of output?
In the light of numerous real (physical, personnel, institutional) constraints
- 12 -
can a rehabilitation strategy best be built down from a macro monetary policy 
pattern or up from a set of real, sectoral programmes (a question overlapping 
relative emphasis on supply expansion/demand curtailment)?
Can a stabilisation strategy succeed (in the sense of enduring) unless it 
either really does relate to largely self reversing problems or is the first 
stage in a longer term structural ajdustment programme to which its short term 
stabilisation targets are subordinated?
What time frames and types of finance are appropriate for integrated 
stabilisation/structural adjustment packages?
And Some Consequential Technical Criticisms
The question of time frames has already been raised. However timing 
assumptions apparently underlying IMF programmes raise further questions. IMF 
trigger clause targets usually assume empirical improvement on monetary and 
fiscal as well as external balance heads within three months of the submission
of a letter of intent.^ This appears to assume either a very powerful
expectations effect (given the prevalence of short lived programme attempts in 
SSA, somewhat unlikely) or a near absence of lags between fund release and 
results. In the context of SSA this is rarely plausible. Ordering, 
producing/dispatching and delivery of imports relating to current production 
and maintenance is likely to take 3 to 5 months, use in production another 2 
to 4 months (longer for agricultural inputs), distribution and sale 1 to 3 
months more and collection of revenue by government or additional cash flow by 
enterprises to reduce bank borrowing a final 1 to 3 months (longer for profits 
taxes) - a total of 7 to 15 months with 12 probably a not untypical
distributed lag from fund release to substantial production and
monetary/fiscal balance results.
% *
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Phasing and sequencing raises similar issues - particularly when physical or 
real (as opposed to monetary and nominal) constraints exist. For example, if 
the main purchases peasants wish to make are consumer and construction 
manufactures and the key constraints on their producing more are inputs (e.g. 
seeds, fertilisers, hoes) then until these are more available neither 
incentives for, nor real possibilities (except by better weather) of, enhanced 
peasant production are real no matter what nominal price changes are 
introduced. If the supply gaps are the result of 20 to 40? of capacity local 
production rates because the 2 0 % to 40Í of ex-factory cost which represents 
imports cannot be met (a not atypical set of conditions in larger African 
economies) then forex allocations (and a source from which to allocate) for 
industry may be the logical (and near necessary) first step toward restoring 
or raising agricultural output. Similarly, whether it is more effective to 
phased in (ratchet) relative price changes (of foreign exchange or grower 
prices or electricity or fuel or staple food or wages) depends to a large 
extent on what the results of rapid changes would be in terms of dislocation 
and of generating forces reversing the initial changes. Because many SSA 
economies are very weak, "shock" cures may be beyond their capacity to 
withstand, while the lags between, e.g. grower price nominal changes and more 
goods for growers to buy may be so long as to cause inflation to reverse the 
relative price incentive before production can respond.
Selectivity - especially in resource cuts - is an area in which the IMF cannot 
be accused of monolithic consistency. On the one hand it argues at a general 
level that one cut is as good as another, at another that cuts should be 
ranked according to efficiency at reducing external imbalance and at a third 
that consumption subsidies, wage earner consumption, production subsidies, 
general government expenditure and enterprise fixed investment stand in that
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order as targets.
There may be (indeed is) much to be <said against excessive wages and large 
recurrent budget deficits, but it is by no means generally true in SSA that 
they have a high import (or potential export) content. Nor is it evident that 
reducing them would reduce credit and inflationary pressures more effectively 
than cutting profits and investment (Rhodesian experience would suggest the 
reverse). Further in much of SSA diversion of imports from additional, 
unselective capacity increases, which will be largely inoperable because of 
import strangulation, to operating, maintenance and rehabiliation inputs 
directed to existing capacity would appear to be a priority for stabilisation 
and consolidation (of exports and government financial balance as well as of 
production and per capita consumption).
Similarly in the presence of foreign balance constraints which, even if 
stabilised by short run output reduction, will be medium term barriers to 
future output recovery across the board (including purely price determined) 
cutbacks in forex use are at least open to question. Translating Bentham's 
utilitarian "pushpin is as good as poetry" into "brandy, Mercedes and foreign 
travel costs are as good as hoes, dyestuffs for textiles and staple foods" 
does not seem to make self evident sense from a production or export 
enhancement viewpoint. Nor, given the increasing consensus that African 
economies are too import and too little export intensive, is there any clear 
efficiency presumption against allocating or market intervening to direct 
foreign exchange and/or domestic credit toward activities likely to raise 
exports and substitute for critical imports whose absence or inadequacy is 
forcing general underutilisation of capacity.
The appropriate volume, timing and conditions of external resource flows to
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achieve stabilisation with adjustment allowing return to growth is not one on 
which the IMF appears to have done systematic analysis. The longer the lags 
before production from present capacity can respond, the greater the time and 
cost dimensions of structural adjustment, the poorer (or more distant) the 
export prospects, the lower the real GDP per capita and the more it has fallen 
from past peak levels, the more urgent these questions are. The answers would 
seem to include high (say $ 1 5 - 3 0 per capita additional resources per year for 
5 years to carry out stabilisation and structural adjustment), sectoral 
programme oriented, long term, low interest finance for a majority of SSA 
countries. If that _is the case - and the World Bank's prudent debt management 
component of Stuctural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs?) for low income countries 
does encompass these assumptions - then substantial 9i - 6 year (or even 10 
year) money except for the most robust, net export earning, quick payoff 
projects is a way to worsen the medium term problems. To be only mildly 
whimsical the Bank should at the least complement its precondition that a SAP 
candidate negotiate a Higher Credit Tranche programme with the Fund with 
another for a low or lower middle income candidate that it must not draw on 
it.
Tentative Conclusions And Implications
First, because the IMF model's assumptions are in full or in part inconsistent 
with the actual circumstances and scenarios of almost all SSA countries, 
stabilisation programmes built on these assumptions are likely to be 
inapropriate in whole or in part.
Second, this may not matter in cases in which the country in question launches 
stabilisation rapidly while possessing leeway in the form of recent past rises 
in imports, personal consumption and government expenditure as well as 
reserves or lines of credit and the external economic environment improves
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within a year or eighteen months. In these cases - e.g. Botswana - quite 
different assumptions from the IMF's might well lead to the same programme.
Third, in other cases an IMF type stabilistion programme is likely to be 
incomplete, inadequate and - less certainly - in part in the wrong direction. 
Its weaknesses are likely to lie .in underestimating (overlooking in extreme 
cases) the importance of real, sectoral or micro, vs monetary, macro factors; 
in placing too little emphasis on supply rebuilding versus demand constraint; 
in overestimating the efficiency of unselective market forces from a
production or external balance recovery point of view and in underestimating 
both the time period needed for stabilisation and structural adjustment and 
the need to view stabilisation primarily as a part of structrual adjustment 
not an end which can be attained by itself.
Fourth, incompleteness and/or inadequacy has significant costs. These
include: substantial delays in negotiating programmes; a high probability of
programme collapse; a tendency for debate (not least by critics of the IMF) to
concentrate on the IMF'S agenda so that other equally critical questions
remain unexplored and unanalysed (to the detriment of alternative adjustment
programmes' credibility and operationality) and, in some cases, a counter
rigidity in reaction to the IMF's which slows or blocks stabilisation measures
12because of the nature of the IMF dialogue.
Fifth, even if (when) the IMF’S broad stabilisation policies are appropriate 
as the first steps toward structural adjustment, 6 year - 9% funding is 
clearly inappropriate for low and most lower middle income countries.
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Notes
1. This was partly but not primarily the result of sanctions and of war.
From 1974 on metal terms of trade have fared badly with Rhodesia (and
subsequently Zimbabwe) significantly negatively affected albeit less so 
than Zambia.
2. Redrawing is, in principle and sometimes in practice, possible. But it 
does not sustain a net inflow of funds from the IMF as opposed to 
averting the shock of substantial net inflows being followed immediately 
by substantial net outflows.
3 . There is one major, surprising exception in SSA. The IMF has not - so
far as is known - pressed the CFA franc zone countries to devalue. As
the CFA/French franc parity was set nearly 40 years ago at a rate 
overvaluing the (then) colonial franc; the French franc has not usually 
been viewed as undervalued; most CFA country inflation rates have been 
above that of France and the CFA economies have quite divergent 
structures, trends and degrees of external and fiscal imbalance, this 
exception is a rather intriguing one. So too is the ability - before 
1979 and to a degree since - of many of these states to combine 
overvalued currencies and liberal import and capital transfer regulations
with external balance and export growth.
4. SSA is a somewhat strange choice of location to give general priority to 
this theme. The region has by far the lowest ratio of consumer transfer 
payments in government expenditure in the world and in few cases consumer 
subsidies are a major cause of government recurrent budget deficits.
5. A notable gap in data is the near absence of detailed studies of the
course, details, issues, alternative proposals, tradeoffs in programme 
negotiations written with the cooperation of negotiators and access to 
underlying documents. (Partial exceptions for SSA include Killick and 
Green in Williamson, 1 9 8 2.)
6. There are exceptions. Botswana's stabilisation programme's market force 
operated real import reduction did centre on consumer amenity goods. 
Tanzania's interventionist allocation of imports has virtually eliminated* 
consumer goods other than grain, pharmaceuticals and the 15 to 2 0$ of 
petroleum products corresponding to non-business car use and household 
kerosine consumption.
7. i.e., this criticism might not apply to selective liberalisation of
categories of goods useable only for production and maintenance or for
specific producers, or classes of producers, imports of goods to be used 
in further production and/or capacity maintenance/rehabiliation.
8. For domestic food or artisanal crops a low nominal (or real) official
grower price leads primarily to more parallel marketing not relative
price shifts in favour of consumers and against growers.
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9 . e.g., wage earners do respond to economic incentives and disincentives.
Sharp and unreversed real wage falls lead to cumulative productivity, 
morale and presence at work losses and cumulatively rising conflict with 
supervisors, employers and the state. None of these can be expected to 
enhance the prospects for successful stabilisation, however defined.
10. All three have embarked on - if not sustained - numerous externally 
designed and funded stabilisation and recovery strategies. Equally each 
is among the relatively few large SSA eocnomies whose gross inflows of 
aid, IMF funds and non-concessional finance in real per capita terms are 
apparently markedly higher in the early 1980s than a decade ago.
11. Therefore substantially nearer to (indeed occasionally before) release of 
the first drawings.
12. e.g. in Tanzania exchange rate adjustment has been lagged by about one 
year and lumpier (i.e. fewer, longer changes) than if there had been no 
dialogue with the Fund and analysis of its complex impact on sustainable 
export crop prices, production subsidy burdens on the budget, income 
distribution and their interaction has been hampered by any such work 
being categorised more as pro or anti IMF than as probably broadly 
correct or of doubtful accuracy.
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